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Abstract—Users with limited use of their hands, such as
people suffering from disabilities of the arm, shoulder, and hand
(DASH), face challenges when authenticating with computer
terminals, specially with publicly accessible terminals such as
ATMs. When authentication through a password or PIN is
possible, these users have an additional reason to choose a short
“easy” combination due to the difficulties involved with entering
lengthy convoluted passwords. Access tokens, like smartcards,
can assist, however, they require that the user can physically
handle such a token and custom reading sensors need to be
installed in access terminals. Similar authentication challenges
are also present in environments where users need to frequently
authenticate and log out or require hands-free authentication,
like in hospitals.
A new glass wearable device was recently introduced by Google
and it was immediately welcomed by groups of users, such as the
ones described above, as Google Glass allows them to perform
actions, like taking a photo, using only verbal commands. This
paper investigates whether glass wearable devices can be used
to authenticate users, both to grant access (one-time) and to
maintain access (continuous), in similar hands-free fashion. We
do so by designing and implementing Gauth, a system that
enables users to authenticate with a service simply by issuing
a voice command, while facing the computer terminal they are
going to use to access the service. To achieve this goal, we
create a physical communication channel from the terminal to
the device using machine readable visual codes, like QR codes,
and utilize the device’s network adapter to communicate directly
with a service. More importantly, we continuously authenticate
the user accessing the terminal, exploiting the fact that a user
operating a terminal is most likely facing it most of the time. We
periodically issue authentication challenges, which are displayed
as a QR code on the terminal, that cause the glass device
to re-authenticate the user with an appropriate response. We
evaluate our system to determine the technical limits of our
approach. We show that even with the relatively low-resolution
camera of the current Google Glass prototype, QR codes can
be consistently processed correctly (with an average accuracy
of 87.8%), and continuous authentication, while strenuous to
the battery, is feasible. Finally, we perform a small user study
involving students to demonstrate the benefits our approach. We
found that authenticating using Gauth takes on average 1.63
seconds, while using username/password credentials takes 3.85
seconds and varies greatly depending on the computer-literacy
level of the user.
Index Terms—Authentication, HCI, wearable devices
I. INTRODUCTION
Google recently introduced a glass wearable device, named
Google Glass, that received warm welcome from certain
groups of users for various reasons. People suffering from dis-
abilities that diminish their ability to use their hands welcomed
it because it allowed them to perform tasks by issuing verbal
commands alone [1]. It also found use from medical doctors,
who used it to access critical information during an operation
without having to shift their attention away from the task
at hand [2]. This paper investigates whether glass wearable
devices, like Google Glass, can be also used to improve the
authentication process, both in terms of usability and security.
We are focusing on two aspects: initially authenticating a
user with a system (one-time authentication), and accurately
determining when a legitimate user has stopped using a system
by continuously authenticating him.
We focus on two groups of users to guide us in our research
(discussed in detail in Sec. II). Briefly, we first examine the
challenges faced by people with disabilities in authenticating
with existing systems, and in particular, with public terminals
and devices shared by multiple users, where solutions like
password managers and never logging out are impractical. As
expected, these users suffer both from usability and security is-
sues, which is also confirmed by a recent study [3] that showed
that they usually select simpler passwords and they are more
prone to snooping [4] when entering their passwords. Second,
we consider the authentication challenges in environments
like hospitals, where users need to frequently switch between
terminals. Users try to avoid having to repeatedly enter their
passwords, or are absentminded, resulting in them leaving
terminals without logging out with whatever that entails for
security.
Some of the above issues can be overcome by using access
tokens, like smartcards, instead of passwords. Tokens are more
secure and potentially more usable, than passwords, however,
the user still needs to be able to physically handle one with his
hands, and they do not provide a solution to terminals being
abandoned by users without logging out. They also require that
custom reading sensors are installed on terminals, which can
be costly and hard to maintain for services with large numbers
of terminals.
The usual solution for preventing unauthorized access to
abandoned terminals is to use timeouts, i.e., logging out a
user from a terminal or locking it after a period of inactivity.
However, timeouts frequently lead to users being accidentally
logged out. For example, consider a physician studying a
patient’s file without interacting with terminal, which cannot
distinguish if the user is still there. Proximity sensors have
been used to address this uncertainty, however, they also
frequently make errors, like logging out active users and
authenticating passing-by users [5].
We attempt to provide a solution to the above problems
by proposing a new design that incorporates glass wearable
devices to offer hands-free one-time and continuous authen-
tication. Our approach, called Gauth [goth], transforms glass
devices to authentication tokens that can authenticate the user
with supporting terminals just by facing them and issuing a
voice command. We exploit the front-facing camera of glass
devices to form an optical communication channel between a
terminal and a device. Specifically, we use a visual code, such
as a QR code, to transfer information regarding the terminal
being viewed to the device, and use it to authenticate directly
with the service behind the terminal.
To provide continuous authentication, we exploit the obser-
vation that users operating a terminal will be most likely facing
its screen. This allows us to use the same optical channel
between device and terminal to continuously authenticate
the user in front of it. The terminal periodically issues re-
authentication challenges, by displaying a QR code, which is
captured by the glass, which, in turn, re-authenticates with the
service. Our approach, enables us to quickly identify when a
user moves away from a terminal to lock it and eventually log
him out. For example, during the evaluation of our prototype
we used a period as short as five seconds. Intrinsically, Gauth
will not accidentally lock a terminal when a user is just
studying something on a terminal without interacting with
it. Even if a user’s terminal is erroneously locked, because
he has to focus his attention on something or someone else,
displaying a re-authentication QR code on the locked screen
ensures that he will be transparently re-admitted when he
returns to the terminal.
We implemented a prototype of Gauth on Google Glass,
which we evaluated by using it to authenticate with an e-mail
service, which we also developed. We also performed a small
user study, after obtaining IRB approval from our institution,
to obtain real data from users operating our system. The study
was accompanied by a short exit survey to gauge user attitude
toward wearable devices and Gauth in particular.
Employing QR codes in authentication systems is not a new
idea. The last four years alone various works have proposed
authentication systems combining QR codes and one-time
passwords. They include systems for online banking [6], [7],
health systems [8], access control [9], web applications [10],
personal smartphones [11]–[14], and voting systems [15].
None of these proposals offers hands-free or continuous
authentication to users. We have also seen applications us-
ing Google Glass for two-factor authentication [16] (2FA),
where one-time passwords (OTP) are displayed on its small
screen for the user to type in a terminal after supplying his
username/password. During our user study, we evaluated this
scenario and our results indicate that users find it harder
to use, than using a smartphone for the same purpose. We
also recently became aware of a company that is advertising
2FA for desktops and laptops that utilizes Google Glass to
authenticate a user with his PC [17]. We do not have sufficient
information to compare Gauth with this approach, however,
it seems to differ in many aspects from our work. The most
obvious being no continuous authentication support and a lack
of a general protocol.
To summarize the contributions of this paper are:
• We propose a new method that incorporates glass wear-
able devices to provide hands-free authentication that:
– can authenticate users faster and more securely than
passwords
– continuously authenticates users, promptly securing
unattended terminals from unauthorized access
• We design a protocol for performing hands-free one-time
and continuous authentication between glass wearable
devices and services
• We implement Gauth, a prototype of our proposal
• We perform a thorough evaluation of our proposal
through a set of benchmarks and a small user study
that demonstrates the feasibility of the approach and
its benefits. Our results show that Gauth authentication
is faster than passwords and operates consistently even
when using small QR codes
• We evaluate the potential of using Gauth for two-factor
authentication
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses in detail two examples that motivate and put our
work in context. In Sec. III we present the model of our
system, including assumptions and our threat model. An
overview of the system’s operation is given in Sec. IV, while
the protocol used for authentication protocol is presented in
Sec. V. Implementation details are in Sec. VI. We evaluate
Gauth and present the results of our user stude in Sec. VII.
Related work is discussed in Sec. VIII. We discuss potential
issues, limitations, and future work in Sec. IX, and conclude
in Sec. X.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
While Gauth can be beneficial for many types of users and
organizations, we present two scenarios that we believe clearly
illustrate the problems our solutions aims to address.
A. Authentication for Users with Disabilities
Accessing a computer terminal is a routine process for most
computer-literate users today. Many of us operate a variety of
different devices during a single day, ranging from personal
smartphones, tablets, and laptops to specialized computer ter-
minals used for banking, buying transportation tickets, and so
on. Users with disabilities frequently face various challenges
when operating such terminals. For instance, people with
limited use of their hands, such as people suffering from
DASH and Parkinson’s, may require bigger buttons (on screen
or physical), while visually-impaired users may require high-
contrast displays. Fortunately, modern terminals are frequently
equipped to assist such users. Concurrently, entities like the
European Union and the United States government have
introduced legislature pushing for further improvements in
universal accessibility [18], [19].
However, performing authentication remains challenging for
many groups of users [3]. Authentication is required to identify
the user and to perform access control. It is prominently
performed using a password or PIN number that needs to
be memorized by the user. Alternatively, machine-generated
codes can be generated by specialized hardware (e.g., one-
time-password generators) or sent to the user from the authen-
ticating service via a message to his personal mobile device.
A past study [3] has shown that users with disabilities
take longer to authenticate when using passwords. Besides
degrading their experience, slower typing may also allow third
parties to observe the password being typed, specially in public
terminals [4]. At the same time, users tend to choose simpler,
easier to guess passwords to facilitate their entry. For example,
they do not choose characters that require using multiple
keys in a conventional keyboard, like symbols, or they simply
choose shorter passwords. Easy to guess passwords are vulner-
able to offline attacks [20]–[24], while not constraining failed
authentication attempts may also enable online attacks [25].
The problem is only exacerbated when using space-restricted
keyboards, such as the ones on smartphones and tablets, as
another recent study with typical users found [26].
When using personal devices to access information, pass-
word managers can alleviate such issues, as the password
needs to be only typed once. On tablets and smartphones, it is
also common that a password is only entered the first time an
application is started and a session cookie is established and
used thereafter to authenticate the user. These solutions are
much harder, or even impossible, to apply when considering
public terminals or terminals and devices shared between users
(e.g., in a workplace).
Another approach is to distribute authentication tokens to
users, such as smartcards and USB keys. These tokens can be
presented to terminals for authentication. While using tokens
can be safer and faster than passwords, it has the following
disadvantages. First, custom readers may need to be installed
on many terminals. For example, RFID readers for contactless
smartcards. Second, the user still needs to be able to handle the
particular token with their hands, which could be problematic
for some groups of users.
Our approach aims to allow users with disabilities to au-
thenticate without the need to use their hands. We are targeting
users that can still operate a terminal, so they do have some use
of their upper extremities, and their vision is sufficient. Our
goal is to transform glass wearable devices to a virtual key
chain that can hold keys for different services, can be easily
utilized by users with disabilities, and has a low adoption
threshold by services.
B. Continuous Authentication for Physicians and Nurses in
Hospitals
Physicians and nurses use both portable devices and fixed
terminals located within hospitals. The fixed terminals can
be in public spaces (e.g., spaces accessible to patients and
visitors) and are usually shared by many different users (i.e.,
the hospital staff). Consequently, authentication is required for
two reasons: first, to prevent unauthorized use of the terminals
and, second, to present each user with their own personal
environment and data that allows them to be more efficient
when moving between terminals.
When users leave their terminal, it is important that they log
out. However, they frequently neglect to do so, because they
are forgetful or in a hurry. Some times, users request to log
out and immediately move away from the terminal, but their
request requires confirmation to complete because they have
left unsaved work, which would be otherwise lost. In other
cases, the decision to leave a terminal without logging out
is intentional and aims to save time, as physicians frequently
perceive authentication as being slow [27], and a physician
returning to a logged out terminal would have to authenticate
again. It is obvious that this behavior can leave terminals
exposed to unauthorized users, but this is not the only problem.
Past studies reported that physician accessing terminals with
another user already logged in has resulted in medication
errors [28], because physicians entered data in the wrong
patient’s sheet.
The most common solution to the issue is to use timeouts,
i.e., logging out a user from a terminal or locking it after a
period of inactivity. Picking the right value is not an easy task
though. Using a short timeout may lead to erroneously logging
out users that are still using a terminal but do not interact
with it. For instance, a physician studying a patient’s file or
momentarily discussing with a patient cannot be distinguished
from him walking away from the terminal entirely [27]. On
the other hand, picking a long timeout means that the same
problems discussed above are still possible. An alternative to
timeouts is using proximity sensors. However, they frequently
erroneously log out active users or authenticate passing-by
users, leading to frustration and hacks like disabling them by
putting a Styrofoam cup over the sensor [5].
Our approach aims to enable systems to continuously au-
thenticate the user operating a terminal and avoiding erro-
neously logging him out or locking the terminal. Our system
allows for checks that determine whether a user is still looking
at the terminal before taking action, while even in the case
where a terminal is locked, because the user has briefly moved
away, it will transparently unlock it when he returns and faces
the terminal to resume his task.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Assumptions and Requirements
1) Device Requirements: Our approach requires a head-
mounted device featuring a front facing camera that can
take static pictures from the point-of-view of the user. While
a high-definition camera is not necessary higher resolution
cameras will allow us to use smaller visual codes on dis-
plays. A screen is not required, however, if present, it can
be used to provide feedback to the user (e.g., the name of
the service he is authenticating with) and for locking the
device (see Sec. IX-A). Sensors such as a microphone and
a gyroscope are also necessary for receiving voice commands
and turning on the device, respectively. The device should have
a CPU capable of decoding QR codes, performing simple
cryptographic operations, and running simple algorithms for
identifying simple voice commands. Finally, it should also
include a network adapter (e.g., WiFi) that would allow it to
connect to the authentication service being used and sufficient
storage to store a user’s credentials for all his Gauth-enabled
services.
2) Device-User Association: A device can be associated
with a single or multiple users. In the first case, the device
is considered personal and identifies the user itself, while
in the latter the device is associated with a particular role
or set of permissions. For example, this can be the case in
hospitals or military compounds where the device essentially
authorizes the user to access a set of terminals and services.
Alternatively, shared devices may be assigned to particular
users when checked out for use (e.g., when a nurse’s shift
starts). Users may also be required to supply a PIN before
using a device, while biometrics can be used for the same
purpose [29].
3) Device-Service Association: A Gauth device can au-
thenticate a user with multiple services. We assume that
before it is used, it has been properly set up to identify
him with a service, after authenticating using alternate means,
like with a username and password. Necessary information
to complete the association can be shared by scanning a
QR code with the glass device, similarly to how Google’s
one-time password generator (OTP) is initialized [30], or by
using another available pairing method [31]. A user could also
physically present the device along with identification to a
service (e.g., the branch of a bank) to perform the association.
4) Deployment Requirements for Services and Terminals:
Supporting Gauth-based authentication does not require any
new sensors or hardware to be installed at terminals, assuming
that they include a screen that can display graphics, like a
QR code. If the user interface (UI) presented on a terminal
is service driven, then no software changes are required
on terminals either. For example, in the case of terminals
receiving HTML content from a service and thin clients [32].
In the opposite case, if the UI is terminal driven, software
modifications on the terminal are required to generate and
display visual codes.
B. Threat Model
1) Adversaries: The most significant threat faced by Gauth
users is theft of their wearable device. An attacker obtaining
the device and knowing the services and terminals it has
been associated with, can use it to gain access to services,
obtain personal information, perform financial transactions,
etc. This is akin to a thief stealing someone’s home key.
The device can be protected using a PIN or biometrics and
the information on the device can be encrypted. In this case,
the attacker would have to brute force the PIN or mimic the
biometric used to unlock the device, before being able to use
it. In the case of continuous authentication, an adversary could
attempt to use a terminal, left by a user without logging out,
before Gauth detects that the correct user is no longer behind
the terminal. Increasing the frequency that a service requests
re-authentication can reduce this window of vulnerability.
In Sec. VII, we evaluate the effects of using different re-
authentication frequencies and how it affects the window of
opportunity for an attacker.
Finally, an adversary could launch an online brute-force
attack against a Gauth service, because the authentication
service needs to be accessible to glass devices, which in
certain contexts implies that it needs to be accessible over the
Internet. However, the probability of such an attack succeeding
is extremely low, as the attacker cannot observe the user’s ID
or his authentication credentials, and such an attack would
be easily detected by the service. An attacker can, though,
obtain the information contained in the visual codes displayed
on the terminal, which are considered public, and identify the
terminal and service to the device.
2) Device Integrity: Our approach has similar security
characteristics to software security tokens on smartphones
(e.g., Google authenticator [30]). As such, we assume that
Gauth software running on the wearable device, the operating
system kernel, and hardware, have not been compromised.
Since devices like Google Glass permit users to download apps
from stores, we assume that the user may have installed one or
more malicious apps, however, these apps cannot compromise
Gauth by reading or altering its functionality and data.
3) Users: We consider the users of the system benevolent,
however, they may expend small effort to bypass the system, if
it interferes with their work. For instance, they may attempt to
trick the glass device, so that they remain continuously logged
in, and a terminal never locks or logs them out.
4) Man-in-The-Middle Attacks (MitM): MitM attacks be-
tween the terminal and the service cannot be prevented by
Gauth. Thus, we assume that terminals and services can
mutually authenticate (e.g., using TLS, certificates, and certifi-
cate authorities). A MitM can relay information between the
terminal and service to enable the user to authenticate using
Gauth. However, our approach submit the user’s credentials
directly to the service, so they are not exposed to the attacker.
We assume that MitM attacks between the device and the
service are not possible, because the device has been properly
set up with the service’s certificate, certificate authorities are
used properly, etc.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Gauth transforms glass devices to authentication tokens that
can be used to authenticate the user with different services.
This section describes our approach for performing hands-free
one-time and continuous authentication.
A. One-time Authentication
Initially authenticating with a system using Gauth comprises
of the steps depicted in Fig. 1. Gauth-enabled services display
a visual code, such as a QR code, on unused terminals, which
can either replace the previously used authentication interface
Fig. 1. One-time, hands-free authentication with Gauth.
or coexist with it. This visual code encodes identifiers for the
service and terminal, but it can also include a random number
(nonce), which is refreshed every time a new log-in dialog is
presented, to produce QR codes that are different every time.
Introducing randomness is necessary to ensure that a stored
picture of an old QR code cannot be used to authenticate with
a terminal.
Authentication is explicitly triggered by the user using a
voice command, such as “OK glass, authenticate” (step 1©).
Google Glass is equipped with a voice command system
allowing developers to enable any application through voice. It
can be programmed to accept new commands, and it does not
need specific training to “understand” new voices. Its accuracy
can drop, though, when the Glass is not connected to the
Internet, as cloud resources are used to enhance the speech-
to-text analysis. Hence, we can program specific keywords
that will trigger authentication. As the device enters power-
save mode when not used, the user may need to also perform
a small 10° head tilt to wake up. This is enabled by the
gyroscope sensor on the device.
The device, which has been previously set up to authenticate
the user with the service, takes a picture of what the user is
looking at, scanning for a QR code (step 2©). If the device fails
for some reason to find a code, it will retry, until a configurable
threshold is reached, in which case it can provide visual or
auditory feedback to the user. The information extracted from
the QR code is used to identify whether the device has been
associated with the corresponding service. Once such a service
is found, the device communicates with it (e.g., over WiFi, 3G,
etc.), presenting the user’s credentials and the corresponding
terminal identifier to authenticate the user (step 3©). Finally,
the service verifies the credentials received and admits the user
in the requested terminal (step 4©).
We see that while the user needs to initiate the process in
step 1©, the rest of the process is automatic and transparent
to the user. Also, the user does not need to use his hands to
type a password or PIN, search for his smartcard, etc.
Fig. 2. Continuous authentication with Gauth.
B. Continuous Authentication
Devices enter continuous-authenticationmode automatically
after being signaled, as part of the acknowledgment returned
to the device, when a user successfully authenticates initially.
The process is based on the same principle as with one-time
authentication, but uses timeouts to trigger, in this case, re-
authentication. It begins with the device receiving acknowl-
edgment that an authentication request has succeeded. At that
point, the service signals that it requires continuous authen-
tication with a minimum period of Treauth and synchronizes
clocks with the device. This means that while the terminal
is being used, the service expects a re-authentication request
from the device every Treauth seconds.
The body of the continuous-authentication loop that follows
is shown in Fig. 2. When Treauth seconds elapse (step 1©),
a new re-authentication challenge, encoded as a QR code, is
displayed on the terminal (step 2©). The QR-code encodes
similar information as before and can be superimposed on the
content in a manner that is non-disruptive. For instance, a QR
code can be placed near the edge of the terminal. Obviously,
a user interface that takes into account Gauth could reserve
some space for this purpose. As a rule of thumb, we try to
use the smallest QR code possible to reduce interference with
the user (in Sec. VII-D we evaluate different QR-code sizes).
The device periodically takes snapshots scanning for re-
authentication codes. Since, essentially, the device has synced
with the service, it will also automatically activate after
Treauth seconds and start scanning for a QR code (step 1©).
As long as the user is operating the terminal and utilizing
the screen, the device will eventually identify such a code. It
will process it and re-authenticate the user by re-supplying his
credentials, as well as the nonce extracted from the code, to
the service (step 3©). Finally, the service verifies the user’s
credentials and nonce, and the code is removed from the
display.
If an authentication token is not sent in a certain amount of
time, after the challenge was initiated by the service, it can
TABLE I
KEYS AND IDENTIFIERS SHARED BETWEEN PROTOCOL PARTIES.
Device Terminal Service
Used ID (UID)
User OTP Key (KU )
Service authentication URI
Service ID (SID)
Service certificate (CERTS )
Nonce OTP Key (KN )
Terminal ID (TID)
choose to lock the terminal or completely log out the user.
Note that if the user has recently interacted with the terminal,
the service could decide to be more permissive and offer more
time for re-authentication. If the terminal is locked, the lock
screen should display the last QR-code challenge made by
the service to ensure that the user can quickly resume. This
way, when the user returns his gaze to the terminal, he will be
transparently re-authenticated and the terminal unlocked. Note
that while the device is in continuous-authentication mode,
it will only issue authentication requests for the terminal it
originally authenticated the user with. So a user will not
accidentally authenticate with other locked terminals.
It may be desirable that a terminal remains unlocked without
the user actively interacting with it. For example, a physician
may be using a terminal to show information to a patient
without at the same time looking at the terminal. In this
case, the user would face a similar problem as to when only
employing a timeout for determining inactivity, however, the
QR code challenge could serve as queue for him to face the
screen or interact with the terminal to prevent locking.
Finally, while a device is in continuous-authentication mode
a visual marker can be shown on its display to provide
feedback. The mode can be exited directly through a user
request, which will also terminate the user’s session with
the associated terminal, or indirectly by the service signaling
the device when the user logs out using the terminal’s user
interface.
V. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
A. Preliminaries
The protocol used by Gauth relies on the transport layer
security (TLS) protocol [33] and one-time passwords (OTP).
TLS is used to ensure the confidentiality of communications
and enables the user to authenticate the service. To securely
employ TLS between the user and the service, the user has
already obtained the certificate of the service CERTS during
device-service association (Sec. III-A3), which also includes
the service identifier (SID) the Internet location of the service
in the form of a uniform resource identifier (URI).
To authenticate the user to the service, we utilize time-
based OTPs [34] (TOTP) because they allow us to authen-
ticate by sending a single message to the service. To utilize
them, a shared key KU is initially exchanged between the
service and the user. Using KU and the current time, the
device can generate an OTP that can be verified by the
TerminalUser Service
= SID|TID|Nonce|[Options]
2
ACK|[Options]
4
UID|OTP|SID|TID|Nonce|[Options]
3
1
Only on
service-driven
user interfaces
ACK|UID
5 Only on
terminal-driven
user interfaces
Continuous authentication loop
Optical channel 
TLS
Fig. 3. Gauth authentication protocol.
service. This is similar to OTP passwords generated by google-
authenticator [30]. Using the CERTS and an OTP , we
achieve mutual authentication of user and service.
The protocol also utilizes a Nonce, which is used to ensure
that older, stale QR codes cannot be used to abuse the system.
We generate it in two ways, depending on the party that drives
the UI. If the terminal UI is service driven, then a random
number is generated by the service. On the other hand, if the
UI is terminal driven, then we use a HMAC-based OTP [35]
(HOTP) generator. This is done to enable the terminal to
generate a nonce that can be checked by the authenticating
service without the need to interact with it. This requires a
shared key KN to also be shared between the terminal and
the service.
The service certificate (including service ID and URI), along
with the user ID and the shared key for generating user
OTPs compose a 3-tuple (CERTS , UID,KU ) that uniquely
identifies an account the user possesses with a service. A
summary of the keys and other information share between
the three parties of this protocol is shown in Tab. I.
While the communication channel between the terminal and
the service is not the focus of this work, we assume that it is
also secure and, for simplicity, that it is over TLS.
B. Protocol Steps
The protocol consists of five different steps illustrated in
Fig. 3. However, only four steps are actually utilized during
authentication. This is because step 1 is only performed when
the UI is service driven and step 5 when it is terminal driven.
In the first case, the service can manipulate the UI shown on
the terminal to display a QR code (e.g., by adding an image
in an HTML page), so the first step involves encoding the
information into a QR code and displaying it on the terminal.
In the second case, the software running on the terminal is the
one generating the QR code.
Step 2© is performed over an optical channel formed be-
tween a terminal’s screen displaying the visual code and the
camera on the wearable device. The information sent to the
device through the QR code includes the SID, TID, Nonce,
and a configurable number of options. The wearable device
reads the QR code and decodes it to retrieve the information
encoded. We rely on the intrinsic error correction in QR codes
to ensure that the information is not corrupted.
Once the device decodes the QR code, it creates a secure
TLS connection with the remote service using the stored URI
(step 3©). Since the device holds the service’s certificate, it
can verify that it is communicating with the correct party. To
authenticate the user, the device generates a new OTP using
KU and the current time, and sends it to the service along
with the information shown in Fig. 3.
The remote service can use the information to verify the
identify of the user in step 4©. In particular, it uses UID
to locate the user’s KU and verify the received OTP. The
service also verifies that the received Nonce matches what
is expected for TID. As discussed in Sec. V-A, the nonce
can be a randomly generated number or an HOTP. After, the
service then responds to the device with a positive or negative
acknowledgment (step 4©), which may also include additional
options. For example, it can flag the glass that the terminal
requires continuous authentication over Gauth and send the
re-authentication period Treauth.
If the UI is terminal driven, the service notifies the terminal
of the outcome of the authentication process in step 5©. If
it was successful, the UID of the user is also sent to the
terminal.
During continuous authentication the protocol is repeated,
as shown in Fig. 3, until the user logs out or his session
is terminated by the service or terminal. Additionally, the
options in steps 1© and 3©, which are highlighted in Fig. 3,
are used synchronize the clocks of the device and the service
(or terminal) to ensure that re-authentication can proceed
successfully. Our approach is based on Lamport’s timestamps
algorithm [36], which is used to determine the order of events
in a distributed computer system.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
Gauth consists of primarily three components: an app re-
siding on the glass device, an authentication layer running
at the service back end, and potentially software running at
the terminal. This section provides technical details about the
implementation of these components and their interactions. For
our prototype, we used a Google Glass device and built a
Gauth-enabled e-mail server and client in Java, representing
the scenario that the UI is driven by the terminal, and the ser-
vice cannot directly manipulate it. To implement the protocol
we used a four-digit number for service IDs, and a six-digit
nonce, which is generated by the terminal as an HOTP and
also serves as its ID. In the options of the protocol, we add
an 11-digit timestamp to execute Lamport’s algorithm [36].
A. Gauth Google Glass App
The Gauth app is Glassware software that runs on a sec-
ond generation Google Glass XE (Explorer Edition) device,
equipped with the Android v4.4.2 kernel and the XE 21.0
update. Gauth was developed with the Glass Development Kit
(GDK), an add-on to the Android SDK. It consists of four
modules, implementing the following functionality.
1) Voice Activation: The GDK’s VoiceTrigger framework
allows the creation of a voice-driven interface via three types
of speech recognition: application shortcut-type voice com-
mands that enable the user to start an application, contex-
tual voice commands that enable users to perform particular
actions within the context of a running app, and free-form
speech-to-text transformation for receiving textual input from
users (e.g., reciting an e-mail). To enable starting our app
using a voice command, we register an intent filter using
the com.google.android.glass.action.VOICE TRIGGER action
in the app’s Android manifest. In our prototype we use the
phrase “OK Glass, Authenticate”. Additionally, we need to
declare what resources need to be used by our app in file
res/xml/Gauth voice trigger.xml. In our case, we require to
use the camera, network, and microphone.
2) QR Code Scanning: To detect and decode QR codes we
use the ZXing engine. ZXing is an open source library able
to scan and decode one and two-dimension barcodes using a
smart device’s camera. Unfortunately, the library available for
Android depends on a remote service to decode QR codes, so
we modified it to create a library that also includes ZXing’s
core image decoding library in order to quickly decode QR
codes on Google Glass. This way we increase authentication
speed and we avoid sharing QR codes with a third-party.
3) One-time Password Generation: Gauth implements
time-based OTPs by integrating google-authenticator [30].
After initially setting up the key shared with the server (KU ),
requesting a new OTP is straightforward.
4) TLS Support: Gauth creates, store, and manages digital
keys and certificates using the Java KeyStore framework and
the OpenSSL library. By default, it stores and uses a list of
trusted CA certificates, similarly to a browser or smartphone.
In our case, we also include a base-64 encoded X.509 cer-
tificate for the e-mail service, which is part of our prototype.
The communication with the remote service is implemented
via the Java HttpsConnection framework, which connects the
device to the service back end over TLS.
B. Gauth Support for Service Back Ends
Services need to support Gauth either by design or through
a middleware that enables third-party services to interface with
Gauth devices. In our prototype, we built such a middleware
to add Gauth support for an SMTP/POP3 e-mail service. We
implemented it in Java and support two different network inter-
faces; the first one is capable of handling multiple Gauth client
connections from users that authenticate using the protocol
described in Sec. V, while, the second one, allows terminals,
in this case e-mail clients, to be updated in real time with a
user’s authentication status. Note that this interface is required
for UIs that are terminal driven, while UIs that can be directly
modified by the service may not need it at all. In our prototype,
communications are secured using HTTPS and implemented
using the Java HttpsConnection framework, however, other
designs that rely on IPSec, or controlled environments like
Fig. 4. Testbed used during the evaluation.
an Intranet or cloud infrastructure, can also be supported in a
similar way with relatively little effort.
C. Terminal
When a terminal UI cannot be directly modified by the
service, but requires support from the software running on the
terminal, some modifications are also required on its software.
To test this scenario, we built a Java-based e-mail client to act
as a thick terminal, which will generate the QR codes itself
instead of the service. Encoding the protocol information in a
QR code and and displaying it on the terminal is done using
the ZXing library. For creating an e-mail interface, we used the
JavaMail API [37] which provides support for SMTP/POP3
server. Communication with the service is performed over
TLS both for communicating with the Gauth middleware, as
well as for delivering the content/service users, in this case
providing access to their e-mail accounts. To generate a nonce
for the protocol, we use HOTPs created (again) by the google-
authenticator library [30].
VII. EVALUATION
This section presents the results derived from the eval-
uation of our Gauth prototype implementation. During our
evaluation, we used the testbed topology drawn in Fig. 4.
First, we deployed the terminal, service, and client in our
own institutional network in the US. Then, we experimented
by deploying the service to two cloud infrastructures. An
academic cloud located in Europe and Amazon’s AWS cloud
in the US. Specifically, the testbed was comprised by the
following elements:
• A second generation Google Glass, equipped with an
OMAP 4430 SoC dual-core CPU, 2GB RAM, 5 MP
Camera and a Wi–Fi 802.11b/g as the network interface,
which runs Gauth
• One high–end laptop machine with Intel Core 2 Duo
P8700 at 2.53 GHz, 8 GB of 1,066 MHz DDR3 RAM
and a 6 Mbps AirPort wireless network card, serving as
the terminal
• One server with an Intel Xeon CPU at 3.2 GHz and 4 GB
of RAM located in the cloud service in Europe, acting as
a remote service
• One server with two Intel Xeon Processors operating at
2.5GHz with Turbo up to 3.3GHz and 2 GB located in
TABLE II
AUTHENTICATION TIME IN MILLISECONDS. THE RESULTS ARE FROM
PERFORMING 20 AUTHENTICATION RUNS FOR EACH SERVICE LOCATION.
Remote service location Mean Min Max Standard deviation
Local 329 265 421 70
AWS (Oregon) 523 451 609 134
Cloud (Europe) 703 584 2115 476
Amazon’s EC2 cloud infrastructure, acting as a remote
service
We conduct a thorough evaluation of Gauth in terms of
performance, effectiveness, and efficiency using human sub-
jects. Our aim is to demonstrate that Gauth is faster than
password-based authentication without compromising security.
More precisely, we evaluated Gauth’s performance, QR-code
readability, which affects the usability of our scheme, and
battery consumption when doing continuous authentication.
Finally, we performed a user study involving 20 students using
Gauth in different scenarios.
A. Authentication Time
Authentication time refers to the overall time required for
a Gauth user to be authenticated by the remote server. We
calculate the mean time from the moment the user activates
Gauth via voice, until a complete authentication is performed.
Authentication time includes all the necessary actions Gauth
requires for authentication as already described in Fig. 3. Fur-
thermore, to correctly evaluate Gauth’s authentication time, we
collect measurements from 20 authentication runs performed
for the three locations of our testbed, and we calculate the
average.
Overall, the mean authentication time with Gauth is 3.8 sec.
This number includes 1.8 sec required to capture a picture
using the auto-focus feature of the camera, followed by the
QR-code decoding process 0.2 sec. Over and above that, it
requires 0.4 sec to generate a new OTP, while the network
communication part over HTTPS takes an average of 0.6 sec.
To activate Gauth via voice command requires an average of
1.7 sec.
This means that when doing continuous authentication with
a period of 5 sec, Gauth is able to perform almost 12 incessant
authentications within a minute. Of course, authentication
time is affected by the network’s quality and potentially
geographical distance between the user and the remote service.
Table II summarizes our results, including the mean, mini-
mum, maximum, and standard deviation of our measurements.
Note that our measurements incorporate the time required to
establish an HTTPS connection with the remote service and
end when Gauth receives the authentication ACK, as described
in Fig. 3 (i.e., messages 3 to 5).
B. Overhead
By overhead, we refer to the computational and memory re-
sources Gauth consumes. Wearable devices do not afford con-
siderable CPU and memory resources, at least when compared
to smartphone and tablets, so overhead can be decisive. Some
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Fig. 5. CPU and memory load while performing continuous authentication
with a period of T = 5 seconds. CPU load is higher than expected due to an
open issue with the Glass’ camera framework [38].
pilot results on CPU and memory utilization for Gauth are pre-
sented in Fig.5. These results correspond to Gauth performing
continuous authentication with a period of T = 5 seconds.
As observed from the figure, we monitored the application
for about 70 minutes before the Glass’ battery discharged
completely. The maximum and minimum CPU consumption
during this time period is 98% and 80% respectively, while
the memory consumption was about 18% – 20%. Overall,
what we observe is that there is a significant increase in CPU
usage during the authentication process. However, this happens
due to an open issue with the Glass’ camera framework [38].
Additionally, we need to mention that the temperature of the
device was notably higher during this experiment, and we even
encountered overheating issues, receiving the error message
“Glass must cool down to run smoothly”, when we tested
Gauth with a smaller authentication period (T<5).
C. Battery consumption
By default continuous authentication can be a power hungry
operation, which can greatly affect battery-powered devices.
In contrast to the official estimation from Google of “one day
battery life”, our experiments indicate that the Glass’ battery
usually drains faster.
In an effort to balance the continuous authentication period
against battery consumption, we measure the battery level
every minute, while Gauth performs continuous authentica-
tion. Figure 6 illustrates the battery consumption during this
experiment, when using a period of 5 and 15 seconds.
With an authentication period of T=5 (sec), Gauth is taking
2% off the battery every minute, while with period of T=15
(sec) we gained 2/3 of more energy. Practically, this means that
within an hour, Gauth is able to perform 720 authentications
with the remote service for T=5 (sec).
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Fig. 6. Battery consumption during continuous authentication. Gauth is
configured to wake and take a picture every T seconds.
In terms of completeness, we also measure 4 fundamental
Glass operations for a 10 minute period. Basic operations, like
stand-by, playing video or receiving and displaying GPS di-
rections, can drain 2.5%, and 6.2% of the battery respectively,
while video recording is in position to consume 31% of the
battery within just 10 minutes.
D. QR-code Readability
The key element of our scheme depends on the high
readability level of the QR-code itself. A QR-code consists of
black square dots –modules– placed in a square grid on a white
background, which can be read by a camera and processed
using Reed–Solomon error correction until the image can be
appropriately interpreted [39]. Failing to correctly identify and
decode a QR code means that the user will not be able to
authenticate and would have retry. The code’s physical size,
the amount of information stored in it, the distance between
the code and the scanning device, the position or the viewport
of the camera, lightning, and, last but not least, the camera lens
are some of the reasons that affect the readability of a QR-
code. Thus, stressing both Gauth and the QR-code to identify
their limits was a primary task. However, in this evaluation,
we do not evaluate factors like the lighting or the quality of
the camera lens.
The QR-code evaluation was performed using the native 5
MP Google Glass camera using the auto–focus function, under
natural light. For the experiments, a 13.3–inch display with
1280 x 800 resolution and 50% screen brightness was used.
To examine the readability of the QR-code, we used three
scanning distances, corresponding to the proper ergonomic
position that a user views a smartphone (“Intimate distance”),
a computer (“Personal distance”) and an ATM (“Social dis-
tance”) screen. Table III provides specific information on these
distances. For these three scenarios, we define three different
TABLE III
NOTATIONS USED IN QR–CODE EXPERIMENTS
Intimate distance: 20 / 7.87 (cm / inch)
Personal distance 50 / 19.68 (cm / inch)
Social distance 120 / 47.2 (cm / inch)
Encoded bits 208 (28 characters)
816 (102 characters)
1920 (240 characters)
units of data (208, 816, 1920 bits), based on the traditional
Version 2 QR-code capacity that consists of 25 modules (26
characters), the Version 6 QR-code capacity used for long
URL’s (like Google Maps address URL’s) (102 characters),
and the Version 10 QR-code capacity that contain vCard
contact information (240 characters).
To create the QR-code image, it was highly important to
correctly specify its physical size, so we relied on a mathe-
matical formula [40] to calculate the recommended minimum
size based on the chosen information data and the distance for
this experiment.
Minimum QR–code Size = (Scanning Distance / Distance
Factor) * Data Density Factor
• Distance Factor - Start off with a factor of 10 then reduce
it by 1 for each of poor lighting in the scan environment.
In our case we use 10 as the distance factor.
• Data Density Factor: Counts the number of columns of
dots in the QR–code image and then divides that by 25
to normalize it back to the equivalent of a Version 2 QR–
code.
Table IV summarizes the QR–code readability tests’ re-
sults for the three different scanning distances, the three
different information data units and the taken images under
two different scanning angles ( 0◦ and 45◦). During the
experiments, the display and the Google Glass were stable in
the aforementioned distances. Thus we decided to perform the
experiments under two different angles, replicating in this way
two more realistic scenarios; i) the user is looking straight the
display, or ii) she is looking under a small horizontal angle.
We calculated the (“Accuracy”) of the system, based on the
successful QR–code decodes, after having performed for each
case study 11 scans of the same QR–code.
Taking into consideration the evaluation results, we can
argue that the Gauth was able to recognize the QR–code and
decode it with high accuracy most of the times. Still, in some
cases, and in contrary to the results from the “minimum QR–
code size” formula, Gauth failed to detect or decode the QR–
code. Failing to do so with the first try, it means that the user
needs to activate again Gauth in the one-time authentication
mode or to wait T seconds (say, 5 (sec)) of an automated try
in the continuous authentication mode. This failure happens
due to either the small physical QR–code size or the low data
density stored on it. Definitely, the accuracy of the system
could be higher if the camera lens were better or the decode
library was in position to decode the QR–code with a higher
error correction level.
TABLE IV
STRESSING QR–CODES
Scanning angle 0◦
Encoded bits Distance Accuracy
208
Intimate 72.7%
Personal 72.7%
Social 100%
816
Intimate 100%
Personal 90.9%
Social 100%
1920
Intimate 54.5%
Personal 100%
Social 100%
Scanning angle 45◦
Encoded bits Distance Accuracy
208
Intimate 18.2%
Personal 63.6%
Social 100%
816
Intimate 72.7%
Personal 81.8%
Public 100%
1920
Intimate 27.3%
Personal 81.8%
Social 100%
Before closing the QR–code readability chapter, we scan
different QR–code sizes from different distances and no angle
(refer to Fig. 7). Each sub–figure draws the percentage of
correctly scanned QR–codes (yaxis) when taking 11 pictures
with Google Glass. As the number of bits encoded in a QR–
code increases (xaxissubfigure 7(a) to 7(i), we increase the
physical size of the QR–code. The different colors correspond
to three distances between the glass and screen: 20 cm, 50
cm, and 120 cm. From sub–figure 7(a) to 7(i), we increase
the physical size of the QR–code.
In Fig.7(a), it is evident that we are able to correctly scan a
QR–code only from a short distance of the screen. As the size
of the code increases, we are in charge of scanning from longer
distances. In Fig. 7(e), the results for 20 cm overlap with the
ones for 50 cm, thus they are not visible. For QR–codes larger
than 453 pixels, we are always in power to correctly process
them (Figures 7(h)–7(i)), even from a distance of 120 cm.
E. User Study
Designing a new human centric authentication scheme, like
Gauth, that can also be applicable by users with disabilities
or user with the need to operate on multiple terminals, like
the nurses, requires evaluation and feedback from real users
through a pilot study.
A pilot study is a trial, which is conducted before the
main study, and not only allows the researcher to define any
problems and provide the required adjustments to the system,
but also ensures whether or not the study is appropriate in
terms of validity.
For the pilot study, we recruited 20 volunteers to use a
custom e–mail client, running on a laptop terminal, authen-
ticating themselves, via the 5 authentication scenarios, to an
email service.
The duration of the total experiment was an hour per
participant, and the precondition was that users should be
computer, smartphone and e–mail users. All users had previous
interaction with a smartphone, but none of them with a
Google Glass. It is important to mention that none of these 20
volunteers was a multiple terminal operator or had a disability.
For the experiments, proper IRB approval was granted, while
users’ privacy and sensitive information were never exposed.
Table V contains a summary of our participants’ demographic
characteristics.
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Fig. 7. Scanning different QR–code sizes from different distances and no angle. Each sub–figure draws the percentage of correctly scanned QR codes (y–axis),
when taking 11 pictures with Google Glass, as the number of bits encoded in a QR–code increases (x–axis). The different colors correspond to three distances
between the glass and screen: 20 cm, 50 cm, and 120 cm. From sub–figure 7(a) to 7(i), we increase the physical size of the QR–code.
TABLE V
PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Characteristics Total
Gender
Male 14
Female 6
Field
Computer Science (CS) 12
Non-CS 8
Age
18-26 11
26-32 6
32-62 3
1) Methodology: During the experimentation phase, the
participants had to use a custom e–mail client, running on
a laptop terminal, authenticating themselves, via the 5 au-
thentication scenarios, to an email Gauth–enabled service. We
should note that all users shared the same credentials during
their single–factor authentication phase, while they had each
time to activate the devices (smartphone and Glass) in order
to perform the second factor authentication.
Due to the fact that none of the volunteers had previous
experience with the Google Glass or our custom e-mail client,
a pre–study tuition during the first 15 minutes of the experi-
ment was mandatory. During that specific time, the instructor
introduced the main functions of every hardware device that
will be used during the experiment, including the Google
Glass, and passed through them several times for every step
of the experiment.
All five authentication scenarios share a common ruse in
which participants were not told which authentication scheme
was to be primary investigated. Each scenarios needed to
be performed 3 times by all users, allowing us to micro–
benchmark the authentication tasks and collect real data used
during the evaluation phase.
At the end of the session, users had to complete an
anonymized questionnaire survey related to their experience
with the authentication scenarios. Additionally to the experi-
mental phase and the questionnaire survey, a 5 minute conver-
sation allowed the investigator to extract valuable information
regarding the participants’ thoughts.
2) Scenarios: During the experimentation phase, the partic-
ipants had to utilize the five authentication methods in order to
access an e-mail account through a laptop terminal. First, we
tested single–factor authentication. Users employed Gauth and
conventional username/password credentials to authenticate
with the mock service. Second, we asked them to use a
username/password as well as a second factor of authentica-
tion. We evaluated three scenarios: using Gauth (2FA Gauth),
google–authenticator on a smartphone (2FA Smartphone), and
google–authenticator on Google Glass (2FA Glass). In more
details these scenarios include:
Username/Password
the traditional single–factor authentication scheme
based on username and password credentials.
2FA – Smartphone
a second factor authentication scheme, where a OTP
was displayed by a mobile.
2FA–Glass
a second factor authentication scheme, where a OTP
was displayed by the Google Glass.
Gauth
a password–less, hands–free, one–time authentica-
tion scheme
2FA–Gauth
the traditional singlest factor authentication scheme
based on username and password credentials, work-
ing in synergy with Gauth as the second authentica-
tion factor.
We should note that all users shared the same credentials
during their single–factor authentication phase, while each
time they had to activate the devices (smartphone and Glass)
to perform the second–factor authentication.
3) Results: The Fig. 8 illustrates the average over three
repetitions of the task for all the five scenarios. The bottom
two lines in the figure correspond to the single–factor authen-
tication, while the rest three to the second factor authentication
schemes. It is obvious that Gauth, due to the hand-free nature,
is not only the faster method in all cases, but grants novice
users with tremendous authentication issues, like 17tn and 18tn
user, to successfully authenticate in less than 5 seconds.
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Fig. 8. Time required to complete entry–point authentication for all 20
users in our user study. The figure draws the average over three repetitions
of the task. First, we tested single–factor authentication. Users employed
Gauth and conventional username/password credentials to authenticate with
a mock service (bottom two lines in the figure). Second, we asked them to
use a username/password as well as a second factor of authentication. We
evaluated three scenarios: using Gauth (2FA Gauth), google–authenticator on
a smartphone (2FA Smartphone), and google–authenticator on Google Glass
(2FA Glass).
Most of the users agreed that traditional authentication
schemes need to be improved. As they comment during the
oral discussion, password-less schemes like the Gauth or the
very recently iPhone’s fingerprint solution permits them to
remember less passwords. The 95% argued that the combi-
nation of username/password with Gauth, is the most secure
authentication scheme across all the scenarios, but in their
everyday life, users would choose Gauth for its password-less
nature. On the contrary, only 20% feels that Gauth is secure.
This can be explained due to the limited or non cyber-security
knowledge of our scheme. Most users, 65%, complain that
they had problem reading the OTP directly from the Glass,
but claim that it is more secure than displaying the OTP on
a smartphone. Last but not least, 75% of the users allege that
they are interested in using Gauth on their everyday basis only
if the cost of the wearable is affordable and more elegant,
while a 65% assert that they will use it only under specific
circumstances, such as at their office, a bank terminal or to
access a room.
F. Security
When performing continuous authentication with period T ,
if a user steps away from the terminal without logging out,
there exists a window of vulnerability W that the terminal is
left exposed, until the service detects that the user is no longer
there and locks the terminal and logs the user out. This is
Time
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from terminal
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Initial 
authentication
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Fig. 9. Window of exposure to malicious users when using Gauth for
continuous authentication. T is the re-authentication period used (i.e., how
frequently it is requested), L is the timeout (since the last expected re–
authentication) after which the user is logged out, and W the window of
exposure.
illustrated in Fig. 9, where a user steps away, missing the next
re-authentication request. Since the terminal probably does not
immediately lock the terminal, an amount of time L lapses
till the user is logged out and the terminal is safe. The figure
makes it easy to deduce that W ≤ T +L. Since even with our
current prototype, we are able to use a period of T = 5sec.
Also, since the authentication time on the local network never
exceeds 0.5 sec, continuous authentication could be deployed
with an L ≈ 1sec. Consequently,W will be considerable small
in most cases. However, future work is required to establish
the usability effects of using such a small L.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Over the last few years, various authentication methods
and schemes have been introduced aiming to improving the
security of computers and smartphone systems. Still passwords
remain the most popular authentication scheme, although their
weaknesses and limitations have been wildly explored. Users
are often advised or required to choose passwords that comply
with certain policies in order to strength their passwords, but
in most cases they end-up with passwords easier to guess than
they had previously assumed [41].
As weak-password prevention and password managers
schemes try to harden the traditional password, many promis-
ing schemes have been introduced over the last few year
aiming to provide secure, cheap, and efficient authentication
methods based on QR-codes, NFC tags or biometric features.
So, the rest of this section will be categorize into three
groups, presenting the most resent authentication schemes in
the literature.
A. Password Evaluation Studies
Despite the fact that passwords suffer from various attacks,
solutions like Telepathwords [41] try to measures the password
strength by simulating password-cracking algorithms and pro-
viding to the users strong passwords [42]. Moreover, with
the increasing hardware availability and the equipped devices
with touchscreens and touch-surfaces, modern password allow
user to draw a shape connecting some software points on a
touch sensor as their password. These authentication schemes
are referred as graphical passwords and aim to combine
the usability of drawing a password with high guessability
and entropy. Still graphical passwords suffer from smudge
and shoulder surfing attacks [43], [44]. Measuring password
strength by simulating password-cracking algorithms [42].
B. Password Managers
The increasing number of password users have to memorize,
made passwords managers very popular over the last few
years. Although the concept of managing password is not
something new [45], password managers have evolved from
traditional software running in the browser, to cloud-based
and mobile device based managers [46], [47]. While the the
usability of password managers has been proven [48], various
attacks have expose their vulnerabilities [47], [49]. In spite
of the fact that, the concept of password managers is very
promising, it cannot work on in many cases like on public
terminals or embedded devices were password managers are
not offered.
C. NFC-based authentication schemes
NFC gains in popularity after smartphones got powered
with NFC readers, allowing them to establish two-way con-
tactless radio communication between endpoints by touching
them together. NFC as authentication token has been widely
utilized by various studies throughout the literature. Recent
studies have proposed mobile credit card payments [50], health
systems [51], password-less authentication and identity man-
agement architectures used for securing web services [52]–
[54] .
D. Authentication based on biometric
While biometric is gaining in popularity the last few years,
interesting solutions have been proposed in the resend litera-
ture trying to improve both two-factor and continuous authen-
tication systems. The work in [55] investigates the possible to
continuous authenticate users while they perform basic navi-
gation steps on a touchscreen device. Same year, a new way
to perform continuous authentication using mouse dynamics
as the behavioural biometric modality was demostrated in
[56]. Very recently in [57], a general approach for continuous
authentication based on keystroke dynamics was introduced.
The authors prove, that it is feasible to authenticate users based
on keystroke dynamics for continuous authentication systems.
Also in [58], a touchstroke dynamic system was introduced as
a second verification factor when authenticating the user of a
smartphone.
A pulse-response biometric [59] sends an electric pulse
through the user’s body and measures is resistance. The
expectation is that each user has a unique resistance which
can be used to uniquely identify them to perform continu-
ous authentication. However, a user’s electric resistance can
change based on various factors, measurements can be affected
by weather conditions, while significant investments may be
required to deploy such sensors on terminals. Also, is it not
applicable to generic online services, similarly to the previous
system.
E. Recurring authentication
Recurring authentication using wearable devices like
bracelets that keep track of a user’s hand movements and
correlates the movement with the keys pressed to continuously
authenticate users [60]. They show 85% accuracy and 11 sec
adversary detection time, or 90% and 50 sec. The error is
too high and this approach only works on terminals, while
it is harder to easily deploy as an additional authentication
measure on generic online services offered through apps or
the browser. Also, Google Glass is potentially a multipurpose
tool, like the smartphone, and is more likely to be adopted
by a larger number of users, while a device can be actually
shared by multiple users.
Transparent re-authentication for mobile devices using be-
havioral biometrics and in particular how a user interacts with
the smartphone through its touchscreen [61]. False positives
are disruptive. Transparently authenticating users based on
how they place calls [62].
F. Authentication for People with Disabilities
Despite the majority of authentication schemes provided in
the literature, people with disabilities have to come across once
again with the limited authentication solutions provided in
the literature. Authentication schemes based on multi-touch
surfaces with with one or more fingers [63], signal-based
methods used to delineate the ECG features and determine
the dominant fiducials from each heartbeat [64], eye-gaze
gestures [65] are some interesting approaches thay may help
and improve peoples every day authentication.
IX. DISCUSSION
As already mentioned, continuous authentication with wear-
able devices is a relatively new discipline. Combining modern
devices with security systems will not only improve the
security of the system, but at the same time increase the
usability and productivity of some end-user categories.
A. Device Theft
Overall, with the increasing risk of the theft or loss of
mobile devices over the last few years, authentication solutions
like Gauth may face extra issues. The person that holds the
device, is also the one that can authenticate. We can argue
that the security of the glass device is similar to locking your
password vault. A PIN, voice recognition, or other techniques
could be used to unlock the device. The device could perform
a challenge-response protocol with the user [66], [67]. For
example, the device could display one character on the screen
and the user would respond (by voice) by adding his secret
number to the displayed one. Furthermore, blending Gauth
with physiological biometric schemes that rely on unique
voice patterns, such as voice-based authentication systems,
will allow only the legit user to control the device [68].
B. Privacy Benefits
Gauth preserves end-user privacy by shielding the user from
keystroke profiling. For example, the service will not be able to
infer what is the disability of the person authenticating, using
methods like timing errors on a keyboard or other sensor data.
Furthermore, pseudonymity can be provided on a per session
basis for user that share the same device under their duty,
like nurses or police officer. That is, each time the device
creates a new unique OTP without requiring from the user
extra credentials.
X. CONCLUSION
We presented Gauth, a system that incorporates glass wear-
able devices in authentication. Our design enables the hands-
free authentication of users with terminals, which we argue can
have a great impact on how persons with disabilities currently
access public terminals and shared devices in the workplace.
We believe our system has the potential to empower people to
overcome some of the physical barriers they face with regards
to accessing online services. Equally important, Gauth can
help organizations safe guard their terminals from unautho-
rized access, incurred by the fact that users forget or avoid
to log out from terminals they use. Gauth allows services and
terminals to determine in seconds whether the correct user is
operating them. We evaluated our approach by performing a
short user study involving students. While the study does not
include persons with disabilities, nor we evaluate continuous
authentication in a real workplace, it is an important first step
that has provided us with encouraging results. We plan to use
these to pursue trials of Gauth with users with disabilities and
larger groups.
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APPENDIX
A. Exit Survey
The following questionnaire was given to the participants
of the user study after the experiments. The number on the
right of each response indicates how many participants chose
it.
1) Personal information
a) Are you a Male (M) or a Female (F)?
© Male 14
© Female 16
b) How old are you?
© 18 - 26 11
© 26 - 32 6
© 32 + 3
c) Field of study
© Computer Science 12
© Other 8
2) General questions related to authentication methods
a) Which type of authentication method are you using in
your everyday life?
© Username/Password 20
© Biometric 3
© Username/One-time password 4
© Public/shared key cryptography 6
b) How secure are the following authentication methods?
(4 = very secure, 3 = secure, 2 = basic security, 1 =
not secure)
© Username/Password 2
© Biometric 2
© Username/One-time password 3
© Public/shared key cryptography 4
c) Do you feel that authentication methods should be
improved in the future?
© Yes 17
© No 3
3) Authentication through wearable devices
a) Is this the first time you are using a wearable device
like Google Glass?
© Yes 20
© No, but not mine 0
© No, I already have one 0
b) Are you going to use wearable devices in your
everyday life in the near future?
© Yes 0
© No 20
© Only some 0
c) Do wearable devices improve the authentication
process?
© Yes, both security and usability 13
© No 2
© Yes, but only usability, not security 5
4) Improving authentication via Gauth
a) Which of the following scenarios do you feel is more
secure? (Select only 1)
© Username/password 0
© Gauth 0
© Two-factor authentication with Smartphone 1
© Two-factor authentication with Glass 0
© Two-factor authentication with Gauth 19
b) Do you think that Gauth can improve the authentication
process?
© Yes, both security and usability 4
© No 7
© Yes, but only usability, not security 9
c) Which authentication method do you prefer? (Select
only 1)
© Username/password 0
© Gauth 0
© Two-factor authentication with Smartphone 1
© Two-factor authentication with Glass 0
© Two-factor authentication with Gauth 19
d) How secure are the following authentication methods?
(4 = very secure, 3 = secure, 2 = basic security, 1 =
not secure)
© Username/password 2
© Gauth 2
© Two-factor authentication with Smartphone 3
© Two-factor authentication with Glass 3
© Two-factor authentication with Gauth 4
e) Would you use Gauth in your everyday life?
© Yes 17
© No 3
